The sustainable development goals (SDGs) 
negotiations on restructuring of international economic relations on the basis of the principles of justice and equality in order to

cradle and a driver of this process and was a factor in its success. Indisputable achievements resulting from collective efforts over 55 years include a consistent consolidation of its foundational programme documents from the first development decade to the Millennium Development Goals (MGDs), continuous improvement of the review and appraisal process, integration of environmental issues into the development agenda, establishment of key development cooperation institutions and a significant increase in financing for development. However, efforts to create the conditions for sustained progress and development restructuring of the international economic system taking account of the interests of developing countries failed. The 21st century inherited the systemic problems of the international monetary and trade systems.
Key words: cooperation for development; United Nations; General Assembly; ECOSOC; UNDP; international financial institutions For citation: Larionova M., Safonkina E. (2018) The First Five Decades of Cooperation for Development. Actors, Achievements and Challenges. International Organisations Research Journal, vol. 13, no 4, . DOI: 10.17323/1996784520180405. The United Nations (UN) sustainable development goals (SDGs) established in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development adopted in 2015 collectively serve as a universal guide for developed and developing countries in their national policies and international cooperation aimed at meeting global challenges. The SDGs build on the outcomes of the Global Partner ship for Development Cooperation (GPEDC), the foundations of which were laid in the 20th century. This article explores the system of international development cooperation 2 as it evolved in the UN from 1946 until the adoption of the UN Millennium Declaration in 2000.
Methodology
This study analyzes the resolutions and official records of the UN's main bodies, and especially of the General Assembly (GA) and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Content analysis reveals the delegations' official positions, interests, contradictions and tensions which may have been concealed by the smooth text of the resolutions. In this quantitative analysis, all resolutions on cooperation for development have been integrated into a special database and sorted by session and area. 3 In total, 9,713 GA resolutions and 3,774 ECOSOC resolutions were included in the database; of these 1,010 and 576 were on development, respectively.
Nine categories of documents have been identified: 1. Basic programme documents, including declarations, strategies and charters. 2. Trade policy and development issues. This includes four sets of resolutions. First, docu ments on trade expansion in developed and developing countries, the rejection of protection ism and the creation of preferential terms of trade for developing countries. Second, resolu tions on multilateral trade negotiations. Third, resolutions condemning the use of sanctions and other restrictive measures against developing countries. Fourth, specific issues such as inflation effects on the prices of goods important to developing countries.
3. Development financing issues, including official development assistance, debt relief and the role of international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB) and regional development banks (RDBs).
4. Sectoral development. This category includes resolutions related to sectors such as agri culture and food, industry, science and technology, education and health care.
5. Special needs of individual countries, including leastdeveloped countries, small island states and landlocked countries.
6. Organizational and operational issues, including reports on UN operations, the work of special UN programmes, decisions to strengthen coordination between specialized agencies and resolutions on the establishment of governing bodies.
7. Creation of UN instruments (special funds, regional commissions, etc.). 8. Disarmament and development. 9. Special development issues (the role of women in development, UN volunteers, etc.) .
The parameters for the quantitative analysis include the number of resolutions, the share in the total number, the number and share of resolutions in individual categories and the dy namics over years and decades.
A Good Start is half the Battle? 1946 Although the resolution on the first development decade was adopted only in 1961, the GA and the ECOSOC had been shaping the basic principles, mechanisms and areas of cooperation from their first sessions.
During this period, the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations Inter national Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the International Finance Corporation, the Expanded Programme of Technical As sistance (EPTA), regional economic commissions and the UN Special Fund were established.
In the resolutions and decisions of the first session, devoted mainly to the UN's institu tional development, issues of direct relevance to economic and social development featured prominently. Thus, six out of 68 resolutions were devoted to the establishment (activities) of specialized organizations, including the WHO, the International Organization for Refugees and UNICEF. A resolution entitled "Agreements with Specialized Agencies" laid the founda tion for cooperation with specialized organizations [UN, 1946] . The GA also discussed and unanimously adopted resolutions on the economic rehabilitation of devastated regions and on overcoming food shortages. Five out of 79 resolutions of the GA's second session approved the activities of specialized organizations (WHO, UNICEF) and the principles of coordination and cooperation with them [UN, 1947a] . The GA also endorsed the work of the ECOSOC 4 on the preparation of annual reports on global economic conditions and trends [UN, 1947b] , calling for recommendations to improve living standards, ensure full employment and create condi tions for economic and social progress and development [UN, 1947c] . However, development assistance and development cooperation issues were not discussed at either of the first two ses sions.
Issues of economic assistance to underdeveloped countries were included in the GA's agenda for the first time at the third session, which adopted resolutions on economic develop ment of underdeveloped countries [UN, 1948a] and technical assistance for economic devel opment [UN, 1948b] . Having supported ECOSOC's Resolution 167 on facilitating the loan process of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the GA cre ated a time bomb: debt began to accumulate very quickly and even by the 1960s debt relief issues became critical, along with the search for sources of development financing. Issues of assistance to underdeveloped countries were discussed at almost all subsequent sessions up to 1960, in cluding not only the expansion of technical assistance, but also practical aspects of mobilizing public and private capital to finance nonselffinancing projects that were crucial for economic development [UN, 1950] .
The amount of funding in the first years was not significant. Funds allocated to the organ izations participating in the EPTA by the Technical Assistance Committee for 1956 amounted to $29,734,085 [UN, 1955] . The majority of funding was provided to the FAO ($8,057,000), the UN Technical Assistance Administration ($6,434,852) , the WHO ($5,689,280) and the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) ($4,940,933) . This distribution trend persisted in subsequent years. Until the late 1950s, the financing of the EPTA grew insig nificantly, reaching the equivalent of $32,241,079 in 1960 [UN, 1959a] . The same year, $150 million [UN, 1960a] was announced as a funding target of the Special Fund and EPTA, and for the first time an objective was set to increase the provision of international assistance and capital to 1% of the national income of advanced economies as soon as possible [UN, 1960b] .
In the late 1940s, the process of creating development assistance instruments began. Deci sions were often preceded by heated discussions. For example, 16 countries, including Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the United States, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, and Denmark [UN, 1952a] , opposed the creation of a special fund for subsi dies and longterm lowinterest loans to underdeveloped countries, arguing that contributions from countries that voted against the resolution made up 78% of the UN budget and 90% of the budget of the EPTA, while remaining silent about their clear preference to channel aid flows through the IMF and the IBRD. Developing countries, the initiators of the resolution, insisted that the IBRD's lending policy did not allow underdeveloped lowincome countries to get loans as they had limited resources to service the debts [UN, 1952b, pp. 331-338] . The preferences of major donors to mobilize private capital for investment in lessdeveloped countries without using government guarantees were reflected in the resolutions of the eighth and ninth sessions of the GA ("On Creating an IFC for Economic Development" [UN, 1953] and "Question of the Establishment of an IFC" [UN, 1954a] , respectively).
The path from the decision to create development assistance instruments to their imple mentation was long and not always successful, since the operational activities of the established structures ultimately depended on voluntary contributions. The decision to establish the UN Special Fund for Economic Development [UN, 1954b] was made in 1954 at the ninth session. After a lengthy study, a resolution was adopted at the 12th session to create the fund no later than 1 January 1959 to help implement projects relevant to countries' economic development. The financial resources of the Special Fund amounted to $100 million a year, to be received mainly from annual voluntary contributions which were to be specified several years in advance [UN, 1957a] . However, behind this smooth formulation were significant differences between the members of the preparatory committee 5 regarding the objectives of the fund, its modalities and the amount of funding. The initial idea (of France) was that technical assistance should be provided to underdeveloped countries through an appropriate programme. National and international banking institutions would finance profitable operations, and the new fund would be designed to finance unprofitable projects necessary for further economic development. The USSR believed that "the Special Fund should provide credit facilities and should grant the underdeveloped countries lowinterest or interestfree loans and subsidies, but it should not disburse all the contributions and funds it receives, as would a charitable organization. It is only in this way that the Special Fund can increase its capital and expand its operations, ultimately raising them to the levels required to meet the vast needs of the economic development of the underdeveloped countries" [UN, 1957b, p. 811] . The proposal made at the GA session on the use of the fund for capital development was forcefully rejected by the United States. The U.S. argued that the fund's resources were insufficient, since in order to support capital develop ment, "financial support in the neighborhood of 400 or 500 million dollars in generally usable currencies should be available on an annual basis... in addition to the sums provided for United Nations programmes of technical assistance" [p. 813] .
At the thirteenth session, the GA adopted a resolution establishing the Special Fund, but not the Fund for Economic Development. It was stated that contributions should be made in currencies readily usable by the Special Fund, consistent with the principles of efficiency and economy, or in currencies transferable to the greatest possible extent into a currency readily us able by the fund [UN, 1958a] . The USSR voted for the draft resolution, but considered it an "interim measure pending the establishment of a really universal fund for the economic develop ment of underdeveloped countries, of transforming the Special Fund into SUNFED, i.e., into a fund for the financing of the economic and industrial development of underdeveloped countries and therefore a fund with much wider aims and terms of reference" [UN, 1958b, pp. 504-5] . This was the position shared by developing countries and socialist states. The GA endorsed the report and unanimously approved the start of the Special Fund's operations at the 14th session [UN, 1959b] , and in 1965 the decision was made to consolidate the Special Fund and the EPTA into a UN Development Program (UNDP) [UN, 1965a] . The question of the UN Capital De velopment Fund, established by the GA's policy decision in 1960 [UN, 1960c] , remained on the GA and ECOSOC agendas for a long time, but it has never become an effective instrument for development financing. In 1967, the fund was essentially integrated into the UNDP and the ad ministrator of the UNDP was entrusted with administering the fund by performing the functions of the managing director, while the governing council of the Programme assumed the functions of the executive board of the fund. It was decided that the pledging conference on the fund would be convened simultaneously with the pledging conference on the UNDP [UN, 1967] .
At the first stage of the establishment of development cooperation instruments, the dollar monopoly became entrenched. The wording on making contributions in convertible curren cies has been included in most resolutions on budgeting. The debate at the 11th session [UN, 1956a] on a U.S.initiated resolution on the use of currencies was illustrative [UN, 1956b] . The document proposed the use of convertible currencies if states provided financing in excess of $500,000. The USSR opposed a resolution "undermining the principle of voluntary contri butions by the member states to the programme for financing technical assistance to under developed countries." The USSR's representative declared: "In the opinion of the Soviet del egation, contributions to the United Nations programme of technical assistance should, at the discretion of each country, be made in national currencies, on a voluntary basis and without any limitations whatever. The Soviet delegation wishes to make it quite clear that it is opposed to any limit being placed on the amount that countries can contribute to the United Nations technical assistance programme in national currencies. It opposes any limitation or discrimination with regard to the individual currencies of other States Members of the United Nations. The United Nations should not give any preferential treatment to individual currencies, including the Unit ed States dollar. The Soviet Union has adequate means, considerable industrial and technical experience and duly qualified experts enabling it to provide underdeveloped countries with effective and beneficial technical assistance in the full amount of its contribution and in any form consistent with the principles of the United Nations. The Soviet rouble is one of the most stable and readily usable currencies in the world for purposes of providing technical assistance." [UN, 1956a] However, with 64 votes in favour, 7 against and 2 abstentions, a draft resolution was adopted to refer the records of the debate to the ECOSOC and the Technical Assistance Committee to consider the issue at the 24th ECOSOC session, where the use of convertible currencies was approved.
An integrated approach and the principle of creating both internal and external condi tions for development were established during the first decade of cooperation. For example, the resolution on the industrialization of underdeveloped countries included taxation issues (avoid ance of double taxation) to attract private capital, as well as the question of an integrated and coordinated approach to industrialization and labour productivity [UN, 1957c] . The role of in ternational economic and trade policy in development became the subject of debate for the first time at the fourth session of the GA, where it was recommended that the ECOSOC take into account the influence of policy measures on the economic development of underdeveloped countries when making recommendations to the GA [UN, 1949] . The resolution "Develop ment of International Economic Cooperation and the Expansion of International Trade" em phasized the role of trade in economic development, the need to reduce barriers, expand trade and approve an agreement establishing the organization for trade cooperation [UN, 1957d] .
At the end of the decade, issues related to the development of the world market and the improvement of trade conditions for development occupied an increasingly important place in development resolutions [UN, 1959c] , including measures aimed at combating price fluctua tions in commodity markets [UN, 1959d] , expanding markets and facilitating access of com modities of underdeveloped countries to the markets of developed countries [UN, 1960d] and increasing the share of their products in international trade [UN, 1960e] . At the same time, decisions were taken that created the risk of market price fluctuations and barriers to the sale of agricultural products of developing countries [UN, 1960f] . This was the case, for example, with a resolution adopted at the suggestion of the U.S. and Canada on the provision of food surpluses to fooddeficient peoples through the UN system [UN, 1960g] . The efforts of a num ber of developing countries to create an international trade organization were ignored or faced polite resistance from the members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
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In general, despite the difficulties of establishment, in the early years the foundation was laid for future cooperation: specialized institutions, funds, programmes and coordination mechanisms were created, and priorities for creating internal and external conditions for devel opment were identified, including the expansion of international trade and financing for indus trial and agricultural development. For the first time, an objective was formulated to increase the volume of international assistance and capital provision to 1% of the national income of economically developed countries.
The First United Nations Development Decade, 1961 Decade, -1970 The period from 1961-1970 was marked by the adoption of the programme for international economic cooperation -the United Nations Development Decade and the World Food Pro gramme (WFP), the establishment of the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNI DO), the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the UNDP, the adop tion of the International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade, and efforts to reform the international monetary system. These are only some of the milestones in the evolution of development cooperation during this period.
The First United Nations Development Decade's key programme document [UN, 1961a] identified measures "required on the part of both developed and developing countries to ac celerate progress toward selfsustaining growth and of the economy of the individual nations and their social advancement...with each country setting its own target, taking as the objective a minimum annual rate of growth of aggregate national income of 5% at the end of the Decade." These measures included assistance in industrialization, creation of a highly productive agri cultural sector, mobilization of domestic resources, elimination of hunger and disease, develop ment of education and vocational training, and research activities. The GA called on member states to provide market access for products from developing countries, to carry out activities aimed at providing developing countries with an equitable share of earnings from the extrac tion and marketing of their natural resources by foreign capital, and to take measures aimed at stimulating the inflow of private investment capital on terms satisfactory both to the capital exporting and capitalimporting countries. At the same time, the goal of accelerated capital inflows and technical assistance to developing countries was reiterated in order for these indica tors to achieve 1% of the total national income of economically developed countries as soon as possible. Governments and specialized agencies were requested to provide information on the gross and net amount of capital inflows and international assistance to the SecretaryGeneral [UN, 1961b] . The planned financing targets for the Special Fund and the EPTA were gradually increased. And in 1965, the UNDP was created through the merger of the Special Fund and the EPTA [UN, 1965b] . Though it was intended to preserve two funds, the characteristic features of the two programmes and the option to make contributions separately.
To support industrialization and expansion of UN activities in the field of industrial devel opment, the decision was taken to establish a specialized body [UN, 1963a] . The resolution of the 20th session of the GA established the UNIDO as an autonomous organization. It was de
The charter of the ITO was signed by more than 50 states and could enter into force after ratification by a ma jority of signatories. However, due to the changed position of the United States, the charter did not enter into force. During the preparation for the Havana conference, a group of 23 states held talks on tariff concessions and on 30 October 1947 signed the final act of the first tariff conference, which included the text of the GATT. The participating countries pledged to comply with the general principles of the first to fourth and ninth chap ters of the Havana Charter. On 1 January 1948, the Protocol on the Temporary Application of GATT entered into force. In the future, the development of the international trading system was carried out mainly under the influence of the GATT . However, in the 1950s, the USSR repeatedly raised the issue of the establishment of the ITO for the development of world trade and overcoming the closure of the GATT, which is "closed and limited…from the point of view both of its composition and its functions" [UN, 1959e, p. 963]. cided that its administrative and research activities would be financed from the regular budget of the UN while its operational activities would be financed by voluntary contributions [UN, 1965c] and by resources from the UN regular programme of technical assistance [UN, 1966a] .
The WFP was established on an experimental basis with an expected volume of voluntary contributions of $100 million per year. The programme aimed to supplement food aid with support for agricultural sector development [UN, 1961c] . The target for contributions to the programme grew steadily and already by 1969 voluntary contributions for 1971-72 were ap proved in the amount of $300 million, of which at least one third should be in cash and services [UN, 1969a] .
Issues of trade as a resource for economic development remained in the spotlight. Trying to correct the effects of the decision on food surpluses, the GA called for the avoidance of steps leading to discrimination and fluctuations in commodity price markets, prevention of adverse market consequences associated with the disposal of surpluses, and convening of a conference on international trade problems, especially relating to commodities [UN, 1961d] . The USSR, which put forward the idea of holding the conference, considered its main goal as being "to work out practical and effective recommendations and measures for the development of trade among all countries of the world without discrimination and artificially created restrictions or obstacles... removal of artificially created obstacles to trade between East and West and to trade among other countries of the world" [UN, 1963b, p. 212] . At the same time it regarded the conference as the first step toward the creation of an international trade organization. The memorandum of the Soviet delegation entitled "Preliminary Considerations Regarding the Main Provisions for an International Trade Organization" outlined the main provisions, prin ciples and objectives of the ITO. The proposal did not find support from GATT members, and as a result, UNCTAD [UN, 1965d] became the key UN body on trade and development. Its functions included promoting international trade, formulating principles and policies regarding international trade and related problems of economic development, facilitating coordination of other UN agencies in the field of international trade, and harmonizing trade and related devel opment policies of governments and regional economic groupings.
In order to improve the efficiency and coordination of the activities within the UN system in pursuit of the UN development decade goals, a general review of programmes and activities of the UN, the specialized agencies, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the UN Chil dren's Fund and other UN institutions and agencies in the economic, social, technical coop eration and related fields was carried out in the middle of the decade [UN, 1966b] . An analysis of the preliminary results from the decade was conducted. In 1966, following the report of the secretarygeneral on the interim results, a decision was taken on an international development strategy for the 1970s [UN, 1966c] . The same year, the GA instructed the ECOSOC to prepare a draft declaration on social development to define the objectives and the methods and means of achieving them [UN, 1966d] in order to complement economic development programmes with social development measures.
An assessment of the progress made toward the goal that the inflow of external resources to developing countries should reach 1% of the national income of each developed country showed that the debtservicing burden in 1965 exceeded by more than half the loans received. Net inflow of aid to developing countries remained almost unchanged from 1961 to 1965 ($6,600 million), and the rapid increase in the debtservicing burden would completely absorb capital inflows in 15 years [UN, 1966e] . The GA urged developed countries to provide at least 80% of assistance in the form of grants and loans at interest rates of 3% or less with a repayment period of 25 years or more, increase the share of untied aid, fulfill the targets set for contribu tions to the UNDP and increase contributions to the International Development Association (IDA) by the end of 1968 [UN, 1966f] .
The problems of growing debt and descreasing international liquidity determined the need for a reform of the international monetary system to make it more responsive to the require ments of economic growth of both developed and developing countries [UN, 1966g] . At the 23rd session (1968), the GA approved the decision of the IMF Board of Governors to establish the special drawing rights facility and called on member countries for the early ratification [UN, 1968a] . Welcoming the historic decision of the board of governors on the first allocation of $9.5 billion in special drawing rights (SDRs) among the fund participants for a period of three years starting 1 January 1970, the GA invited members to consider the possibility of establishing a link between the allocation of the new reserve asset and the provision of additional financing to developing countries, as well as speeding up consideration of quota adjustments to meet the special needs of developing countries [UN, 1969b] .
Most development issues were worked out within the Second Committee of the GA (eco nomic and financial issues). However, development issues were integrated into the work of all committees. The use of resources released as a result of disarmament was discussed by the First Committee (issues of disarmament and international security). The right to development was the focus of the Third Committee (social, cultural and humanitarian issues). One of its achieve ments was the adoption of the Declaration of Social Progress and Development in 1969 [UN, 1969c] . The declaration emphasized the interdependence of economic and social development, calling for a change in international economic relations, in which equality of opportunity should be as much a prerogative of nations as of individuals within a nation.
In the first development decade, there the tendency to integrate development assistance and environmental issues emerged [UN, 1968b] . During the preparation of the UN Confer ence on the Human Environment, there was an acute discussion of the alignment of the In ternational Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade goals to improve and preserve the ecological balance with the financial responsibility in the form of additional assistance to developing countries [UN, 1970a, p. 3] . Canada, France, Japan, Luxembourg, New Zealand, South Africa, the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia and Belgium voted against this provision. It was decided that a second session of the prepara tory committee would be held to consider the issue of providing additional funds to developing countries for the protection of the environment [UN, 1970b] .
The International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade, adopted after a lengthy preparation and taking into account the evaluation of pro gress of the first decade, did not include environmental conservation in the goals, objectives or policy measures of development cooperation [UN, 1970c] . The declaration stated a sustained improvement in the wellbeing of everyone and bestowing benefits on all as an ultimate objec tive. It recorded the key principles: the entire international community bears a common and shared responsibility for economic and social progress while the primary responsibility for the development of developing countries rests upon themselves. The following objectives were set: to achieve by 1980 the growth rate of the developing countries' gross product of at least 6%, per capita product of at least 3.5%, a manufacturing output growth rate of 8%, agricultural output growth of 4% and annual growth in exports and imports of 7%. To achieve these goals, meas ures were envisaged to expand trade and economic cooperation and remove barriers to trade, as well as special measures taking into account the special needs of leastdeveloped countries and landlocked countries. The priority source of financing was mobilization of developing coun tries' resources by strengthening tax administration systems, increasing the efficiency of public enterprises and creating conditions for private investment. Developed countries were expected to provide investments and assistance: By 1972, the target volume of financial resource transfers to developing countries were meant to reach a minimum net amount of 1% of their gross na tional product at market prices annually. A major part was supposed to be provided in the form of official development assistance (ODA). Each economically developed country should exert its best efforts to reach a minimum net ODA amount of 0.7% of gross national product (GNP) at market prices by the middle of the decade. A system of measures was provided to ensure a systematic review and assessment of the implementation of goals and objectives at all levels. Thus, for the first time, a comprehensive document was adopted which became the foundation of international development cooperation for the next decades. Financial objectives for assis tance in the amount of not less than 1% of the GNP of economically advanced countries were also recorded in the Declaration of Social Progress and Development, adopted a year earlier at the 24th session of the GA [UN, 1969d] .
The Second United Nations Development Decade, 1971 Decade, -1980 The key milestones of the Second United Nations Development Decade include the gradual inte gration of development and environmental issues, efforts to overcome the international monetary crisis and to provide liquidity and financing for development, alleviation of the growing debt burden of developing countries, increased pledging targets for the UNDP, the WFP and special funds, de cisions on the development and adoption of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, efforts to promote implementation of the differential treatment principle with regard to developing countries in the framework of the GATT, preparation and adoption of the International Develop ment Strategy for the Third United Nations Development Decade and the unsuccessful attempt to launch global negotiations on international economic cooperation for development.
At the beginning of the decade, the preparatory process for the UN Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm Conference) was overshadowed by the struggle between the USSR and the socialist countries on the one hand, and the United States and NATO countries on the other, for the right of the German Democratic Republic to participate on equal terms [UN, 1971a] . 7 In 1971, on the eve of the conference a GA resolution for the first time laid the principle of common but differentiated responsibility for maintaining ecological balance, and also the sovereign right of each country to exploit its resources in accordance with the needs of development in such a way that its environmental policy does not have a negative impact on economic growth of developing countries. The resolution emphasized that the development of international cooperation to prevent, eliminate or reduce adverse environmental effects should not negatively affect the progress of developing countries, including the deterioration of the terms of trade as a result of creating additional obstacles such as nontariff barriers, decreases in the inflow of international development assistance and deterioration of its terms and condi tions [UN, 1971b] . In December 1972, noting the recommendations of the conference, the GA emphasized that resources for environmental development programmes should be additional in relation to the existing level and the projected growth in resources stipulated in the Interna tional Development Strategy [UN, 1972a] . These principles have become fundamental in the UN system for many decades of development cooperation.
In the course of the second decade, the issues of financing for development and servicing developing countries' debt remained acute. According to WB estimates, the growing burden of external debt exceeded $7,000 million in 1972 [UN, 1972] . The first biennial review of the implementation of the International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations De velopment Decade showed that the net aggregate transfer of financial resources was lower than planned amounting to 0.69% of the GDP in 1972, while the ODA level stood at 0.33% in 1972, decreasing from 0.86 and 0.50 respectively in 1961 [UN, 1973a] . Inflation, the limited access of developing countries to the financial markets of developed countries and lack of progress in the reform of the international monetary system exacerbated the situation. Reform of the international monetary system [UN, 1973b] , replenishment of the International Development Association [UN, 1975a] , recapitalization of the IBRD [UN, 1976a and the impact of inflation on the development process [UN, 1977a] remained high on the GA's agenda. The issues of taking into account the interests of developing countries in revising IMF quotas, en suring greater international liquidity, creating a link between SDRs and additional resources for financing development were discussed at each session of the GA [UN, 1971c] . Steps to re form the international monetary system were limited to measures within the IMF. This was the principled position of the United States, while the Soviet Union, not participating in the IMF, opposed such an approach. At the 34th session of the GA, the United States and its partners opposed [UN, 1976b, p. 450] and subsequently practically blocked the proposals of the Group of 77 to consider a programme of action for further development of the international monetary system so that "progress in this area could contribute to the establishment of the new interna tional economic order" [UN, 1979f] .
The United States has consistently opposed resolutions to accelerate the transfer of real resources to developing countries, including to meet the target of 0.7% of the gross national income, revise rules concerning access of developing countries to capital markets, and reorgan ize the entire system of debt renegotiation so that it ensures the achievement of development goals rather than commercial ones [UN, 1976c] . The United States also opposed reorganizing the entire debt repayment system and improving access to international capital markets [UN, 1977b] .
In 1977, debts amounted to $200 billion, which was the result not only of insufficient assistance, but also reduced export earnings and increased import costs. The GA and UNC TAD had consistently advocated for eliminating trade barriers, urging the participants of the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations to take into account the interests of developing countries, provide significant concessions on products from the leastdeveloped countries, and preferences for goods from developing countries [UN, 1972c] . The United States objected to the principle of nonreciprocity and differential and special treatment in favour of developing countries, significant reduction in tariff and nontariff restrictions on the trade of developing countries, and elimination of restrictions in, and improvement of, the generalized system of preferences [UN, 1978a [UN, , 1978b . It may be recalled that the results of the Tokyo Round were modest.
Efforts to create an external environment for development were accompanied by meas ures to strengthen UN mechanisms. UNDP resources were increasing. In the first half of the decade, an objective was set to increase contributions by 15% annually to promote the goal of doubling resources by 1975 [UN, 1972d] . It was decided that a UN special fund would be established under the auspices of the GA, as a part of the special programme to provide emer gency relief and development assistance. The fund was empowered to make grants and loans on concessionary terms, and, as appropriate, to participate in investments to countries most seri ously affected by economic crises and to enter into management contracts with the IBRD, the IMF and the regional development banks [UN, 1974] . The objective was set again to ensure the achievement of a funding target of $1 billion [UN, 1975b] .
In accordance with the objectives in the second development decade to increase growth rates in industrial and agricultural production, specialized development assistance bodies in these areas were strengthened. The UN Industrial Development Fund [UN, 1976d] was created to supple ment the UN Industrial Development Program. An objective was set to achieve the Industrial Development Fund funding level of $70 million by 1979 [UN, 1978c] . Later the resources of the fund and the program were pooled. At the same time the transformation of the UN Industrial De velopment Organization into a specialized agency [UN, 1977c] and strengthening of operational activities in the field of industrial development began [UN, 1977d] . The target for contributions to the WFP was growing and amounted to $950 million for the last biennium of the decade [UN, 1977e] . The International Fund for Agricultural Development with a target amount of funding of SDR 1 billion was established [UN, 1975c] . The growing role of science and technology in facili tating growth and development was reflected in the approval of the Vienna Programme of Action, the decision to establish the Intergovernmental Committee and the Centre for Science and Tech nology for Development within the UN Secretariat, and the creation of a financing system with expected Interim Fund resources of $250 million [UN, 1979a] .
In preparing an international development strategy for the third development decade, key programme measures were identified in the areas of improving conditions for agricultural pro duction, developing infrastructure, promoting industrialization, improving the terms of trade, reforming the monetary system and promoting the transfer of technology [UN, 1978d] . It was proposed that the flow of resources to developing countries should significantly increase so that funding during the 1980-1990 decade would amount to $300 billion with annual commit ments of at least $25 billion during the early years [UN, 1979b] . 8 The International Develop ment Strategy for the Third United Nations Development Decade [UN, 1980a] set even more ambitious goals than its predecessors, envisioning an average annual rate of GDP growth of 7%, per capita gross domestic product growth of about 4.5% per year, accelerated growth of manufacturing output of about 9% per year, an increase in the share of developing countries in world manufacturing production to 25% by 2000, gross investment of 28% of GDP by 1990, and exports and imports growth of 6% and 8% respectively.
As the most important condition for the development of developing countries and the growth of the global economy, the objective of intensifying efforts to restructure the interna tional monetary system was postulated: "The international monetary system should provide for the equitable and effective participation of developing countries in decision making, taking into account, inter alia, their growing role in the world economy, as well as a symmetrical and efficient adjustment process, stability of exchange rates of international currencies, and further strengthening and expansion of the special drawing rights as the central reserve asset in order to ensure better international control over the creation and equitable distribution of international liquidity" [UN, 1980a, para. 26] .
The parameters of financing for development remained at the level established in the first and second development decades: an increase in ODA to 0.7% of developed countries' gross national product by 1985 and further growth to 1%. To ensure food security and eradicate hun ger, WFP resources must grow to at least $1 billion a year. Members of the European Com munity, the U.S., Canada and Australia expressed their support for the Strategy. The European Community reaffirmed full readiness to make its best effort to achieve the target of 0.7% of gross national product by the end of the decade [UN, 1980b] .
Developing countries, while generally supporting the Strategy, noted that the text did not meet their expectations. Speaking on behalf of the G77, the representative of Venezuela said: "Among the positive aspects of the new Strategy, special reference should be made to the pre amble, which clearly recognizes the need for structural change in international relations as well as for the establishment of a new international economic order; the adoption of a scenario of higher general growth targets than in the past Decade, based on an annual growth rate of 7% of the gross national product of the developing countries, including a timeframe for the attain ment of the 0.7% target for official development assistance, a target carried over laboriously from the previous Strategy; the drawing up of general frameworks for action on two farr eaching issues in the present international situation, namely monetary questions and energy; various important objectives in the area of trade; the particular and unprecedented attention to be de voted to the needs of the special categories of developing countries as an integral concept; and a section on the review and appraisal of the new Strategy, which is considerably stronger than the one agreed upon for the previous Decade."
At the same time, the countries of the G77 stressed that the Strategy did respond to the de veloping countries aspirations: "In the paragraphs dealing with the economic part, such a large number of reservations and interpretative declarations are made. These indicate not just a lack of political will on the part of many developed countries, but their real opposition to measures for restructuring the international economic system in order to ensure equity, justice and stabil ity in world economic relations, which are unquestionably the fundamental objectives of the new international economic order" [UN, 1980b, p. 93] . The German Democratic Republic, on behalf of the socialist states, supported the provisions of the Strategy, but the socialist states refrained from assuming the obligation to allocate a fixed share of their gross national product for assistance purposes. The socialist countries also noted the Strategy's lack of ambition in comparison with the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Or der 9 and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States [UN, 1980b, p. 82] .
10
The development and adoption of the Declaration on the Establishment of a New In ternational Economic Order and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States was an attempt to change the global balance of power and ensure full and equal participation of developing countries in the formulation and implementation of all decisions affecting the in ternational community. The ambitious goals stated in the documents were not implemented, nor was the G77 initiative on global negotiations relating to international economic cooperation for development, approved at the 34th session of the GA [UN, 1979d] . This became one of the landmark failures of the third development decade.
The goal of the global negotiations was "the establishment of a new system of interna tional economic relations based on the principles of equality and mutual benefit" [UN, 1979c, pp. 652-3] and a comprehensive solution to such problems as "generalized inflation; unemp loyment; protectionism; the inadequacy of the financial and monetary systems, the continuing deterioration in the balance of payments and the disorder in trade in raw materials and energy" [Ibid, p. 656] .
11 The socialist states supported the process. The text of the resolution stressed that the global round of negotiations "should not in volve any interruption or have any adverse effects upon the negotiations in these forums, but should reinforce and draw upon them" [Ibid, p. 652] . 12 This was the principled position of the United States and developed countries. The United States agreed "to launch a ship called global negotiations," but stressed that "this ship cannot begin its voyage unless our work successfully constructed it." Formally agreeing to the process, the United States opposed its essence: "Re garding paragraph 2, we appreciate the strong desire of many nations to ensure that the global negotiations take place in the United Nations system and that they cover many categories of 9 The Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order was adopted by Resolution 3201 (SVI) of the UN General Assembly on 1 May 1974. 10 The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States was adopted by Resolution 3281 (XXIX) of the UN General Assembly on 12 December 1974.
11 From a presentation by the representative of Mexico. 12 From a statement by the representative of Pakistan, who introduced the draft resolution. subjects. We support this general concept. But we want to make unambiguously clear that there are certain subjects that can be, and in fact must be, negotiated in their appropriate forums. International monetary issues must be negotiated in IMF; matters related to the General Agree ment on Tariffs and Trade must be negotiated in GATT. We can certainly conceive of a struc ture that would permit the work of these forums and other active specialized forums to be part of the entire process. In this connection, we emphasize that the final phrase of paragraph 2 (a) "without prejudice to the central role of the General Assembly," does not alter the respective roles and powers of the various organizations of the United Nations system that are spelled out in their relationship agreements with the United Nations, nor does it change the recommenda tory nature of United Nations General Assembly resolutions and decisions as established in the Charter. We are pleased that paragraph 3 states that global negotiations should neither interrupt nor adversely affect ongoing negotiations. It is our view, for example, that the duplication of active negotiations being held in other forms would represent such an adverse impact" [Ibid, p. 657] .
13 Thus, the threedecadeslong struggle of the G77 to restructure international eco nomic relations and establish a new world order was, in fact, initially doomed to failure. The second decade was marked by undoubted success in strengthening the UN mechanisms for promoting development and agreeing on ambitious goals for the third development decade. At the same time, developing countries' efforts to reform the system of international economic relations faced firm opposition from developed countries.
The Third United Nations Development Decade, 1981-1990: Integrating Environmental Protection into Cooperation for Development
The third development decade was marked by efforts to strengthen scientific, technical [UN, 1981a] 14 and industrial potential [UN, 1981b] , 15 develop the energy resources of developing countries [UN, 1982a] , 16 adopt the Global Strategy for Health for All by the year 2000 [UN, 1981c] , find a longterm solution to debt problems [UN, 1986a] , adopt the Declaration on the Right to Development [UN, 1986b] 17 and prepare and adopt the International Development Strategy for the Fourth United Nations Development Decade. Negative trends in the global economy (economic slowdown, currency instability, increased protectionism, structural imbal ances) jeopardized the implementation of the goals of the International Development Strategy for the Third United Nations Development Decade [UN, 1982b] . In this context, efforts of the 13 From the speech of the U.S. representative. 14 The guiding principles for the financing system were approved: the asymmetry of the technological capacity between developed and developing countries, a predictable, continuous and substantial flow of resources in addition to those existing within the UN system, untied resources, and core resources of $200 million per year for the financing system for the period 1983-85. 15 Decisions were taken to ratify the new constitution of the UN Industrial Development Organization so that it could become a new specialized agency in 1982, to secure the budget of the Industrial Development Fund in the amount of $50 million annually, to expand programmes and projects in the field of energyrelated industrial technology, and to prepare a UN conference on industrial development in 1984. 16 For example, by increasing the resources of the World Bank and regional banks on favourable terms for the purposes of exploration and development of natural resources.
17 Development is a comprehensive economic, social, cultural and political process aimed at constant improvement of the wellbeing of the entire population and of all individuals on the basis of their active, free and meaningful participation in development and in the fair distribution of benefits resulting therefrom. States are responsible for creating national and international conditions favourable to the realization of the right to development. (1461 (U.S.) 8) international community were focused on three main areas: the restructuring of international economic relations, the implementation of the objectives of the Strategy, the principles of the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order and the objectives of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, and overcoming the external debt crisis [UN, 1988a] while ensuring sufficient resources for development financing [UN, 1988b] .
At its 37th session, evaluating the global crisis as a result of the disruption of the structural balance and the functioning of international relations, the GA called for concrete emergency measures in favour of all developing countries on the most pressing issues, including deficits in the balance of payments, deterioration in the terms of trade, adverse effects of high interest rates on the servicing of external debt, insufficient flows of foreign assistance, inequitable terms of tech nology transfer, impediments to access to the capital markets, and price fluctuations of raw ma terials [UN, 1982c] . At the same time, the GA recalled the need to conduct global negotiations on international cooperation. Despite the political will of the G77, four years after the decision to launch the preparatory process, constructive dialogue did not begin due to opposition from the United States and its G7 partners. At the 37th session [UN, 1982d] the discussion on the launch of global negotiations was actually blocked by the United States and other G7 members taking the position that the formula adopted in the G7 Versailles Declaration should be the basis for global negotiations: "The launching of global negotiations is a major political objective approved by all participants in the Summit. The latest draft resolution circulated by the Group of 77 is helpful, and the discussion at Versailles showed general acceptance of the view that it would serve as a basis for consultations with the countries concerned. We believe that there is now a good prospect for the early launching and success of the global negotiations, provided that the independence of the specialized agencies is guaranteed" [G7, 1982] . The G77's objection that "the Versailles commu nique, instead of facilitating the negotiations which we would have believed to be a rational and logical response, has instead created a stalemate" [UN, 1982e, p. 918] , faced a formal U.S. re sponse: "Realism requires that we recognize remaining differences on global negotiations and that we candidly discuss and try to cooperate in reconciling them" [Ibid, p. 921] . At the 38th session, the G7 actually pushed the Versailles formula as the basis for negotiations, but even after their launch, the condition of guaranteeing the independence of the specialized agencies created an insurmountable obstacle to finding comprehensive solutions to the restructuring of international economic relations, taking into account the growing role and needs of developing countries.
Measures to resolve external debt problems were discussed at almost every session. Consid ering that developing countries' debts became an obstacle to economic growth, increased the vul nerability of the international financial system, adversely affected the ability of debtor countries to import and creditors to export, and created risks for political and social stability, the GA called for strengthened work on the preparation of an international growth and developmentoriented strategy [UN, 1987a] . The strategy to find a durable solution to the debt problem proposed at the 44th session formulated as a priority the creation of conditions for growth and development, in cluding the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations to improve market access for the export products of developing countries, active efforts to diversify exports of devel oping countries, an increase in external resources to complement domestic measures conducive to capital formation in developing countries, a strengthened role for multilateral financial institu tions, and readiness of creditor countries to write off or reduce debts [UN, 1989a] . The United States voted against the resolution, believing that it did not pay enough attention to the needs of domestic reforms in developing countries, did not recognize the key role of the IMF and the World Bank, and raised issues that should be discussed in other specialized agencies. Neverthe less, at the next session, the resolution was adopted without a vote [UN, 1990b] .
Development issues were often used as instruments in the political struggle by both de veloped and developing countries. In the 1980s, six resolutions were adopted calling on the United States to abandon the threat or use of trade embargoes, restrictions and other measures as a form of political and economic coercion which violate the sovereign rights of developing states. 18 In the fourth development decade, such resolutions were adopted every two years [UN, 1983 [UN, , 1984 [UN, , 1985 [UN, , 1986c [UN, , 1987b [UN, , 1989b .
Resolutions were usually initiated by the G77, supported by the socialist countries, but rejected by the United States and its partners. 19 In fact, if development assistance measures were used by developed countries in relation to developing ones as "carrots," then measures of economic coercion were applied as "sticks." It is clear that such measures violated the spirit and the letter of the UN Charter and the programme documents of the organization, including the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. Therefore, the United States consistently opposed resolutions to review the implementation of the charter [UN, 1982f] .
Box
Despite geopolitical changes and obvious inefficiency, the practice of adopting resolu tions condemning the use of sanctions continued in the 1990s. Seven such resolutions were adpted. In the mid1990s, the extraterritorial use of sanctions by the U.S. against European companies operating in Iran and Libya changed the balance in voting. At the 51st session, the United States was supported only by Israel, Micronesia and Uzbekistan [UN, 1996b] ; at the 52nd session, only the United States opposed the resolution [UN, 1997a] . At the 53rd session European Union members stated they were against sanctions but abstained from voting, and the U.S. was supported only by Israel [UN, 1998a] . Sanc tions against Yugoslavia in December 1999 were supported by Germany and the Marshall Islands [UN, 1999a] .
Resolutions on the relationship between disarmament and development providing for the use of resources released through disarmament for development purposes also became stum bling blocks [UN, 1984 [UN, , 1987c [UN, , 1988c [UN, , 1989d . They built on the initiative put forward by the USSR in 1973 at the 28th session of the GA [UN, 1973c] . The United States refused to take part in the international conference on this issue, refrained from participating in the preparation of the draft resolution and did not "consider itself bound or committed in any way by either the declarations in the Final Document of the recent International Conference or the terms of any resolution" adopted there [UN, 1987d, p. 13] . 20 The achievements of the third decade included decisions on sustainable development. The report of the World Commission on Environment and Development for the first time set the objective of reorienting national and international policies toward sustainable development models, which implied that "meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs, should become a central guiding principle." [UN, 1987e] The GA called on the governing bodies, organizations and programmes of the United Nations system to review their activities and programmes through the lens of sustainable devel opment and to link development plans, priorities and objectives with sustainable development commitments. The principle of an equitable sharing of the environmental costs was formulated [UN, 1987e] . At its 44 th session the GA stressed that "poverty and environmental degradation are closely interrelated and that environmental protection in developing countries must, in this context, be viewed as an integral part of the development process and cannot be considered in isolation from it" agreed to convene the UN conference on environment and development. The Conference held in June 1992 confirmed the principle in the Rio Declaration [UN, 1992d] . Plans were made to elaborate measures to promote sustainable and environmentally sound de velopment, to identify ways and means of providing new and additional resources, particularly to developing countries, for environmentally sound development programmes and projects, and to consider financing mechanisms and examine the possibility of creating a special fund [UN, 1989e] . These aspects were reflected in the International Development Strategy for the Fourth United Nations Development Decade.
The Strategy included six interrelated goals: a surge in the pace of economic growth in de veloping countries; ensuring a development process that is responsive to social needs and seeks a significant reduction in poverty, that promotes the development of human resources and is environmentally sound and sustainable; improving the international monetary, financial and trading systems to support development; ensuring the sustainability and stability of the world economy and sound macroeconomic management; strengthening international development cooperation; and mobilizing efforts to deal with the problems of the leastdeveloped countries. Measures to protect and enhance the environment were included in priority aspects of develop ment [UN, 1990a] .
The Strategy has become an important milestone in the evolution of cooperation for sus tainable development. However, it should be recognized that the decade was not a period of great achievements. Common tasks and problems have neither united countries with different ideologies, nor helped overcome national egoism. 20 The history of this issue deserves separate consideration and will be presented in an article devoted to the participation of the USSR in the process of establishing a development assistance system under the auspices of the UN.
The Fourth United Nations Development Decade, 1991-2000: Toward a Global Partnership for Development
The beginning of the fourth development decade was marked by the end of the collapse of the USSR and the world socialist system. The Russian Federation became the successor of the USSR in international legal relations and in the UN system. The process of restructuring and integration of the socialist countries into the world economy and structures of international economic cooperation began. Developing countries whose economies were affected by changes in their economic relations with the countries of Eastern and Central Europe [UN, 1991a] were concerned about a possible reduction in development assistance as a result of support for coun tries with economies in transition. These concerns were discussed in the GA and reflected in relevant UN resolutions [UN, 1992a] .
A resolution of the growing debt crisis was heatedly debated at all sessions, but this did not lead to fundamental changes and could not prevent the financial crisis. Measures to write off and restructure debts were clearly not sufficient [UN, 1991b [UN, , 1992b [UN, , 1994 [UN, , 1995a . The reform of the international financial system blocked by the U.S. determination to maintain independ ence of and control over the IMF and the World Bank, and therefore was limited to rhetorical calls by the GA to strengthen collaboration between the UN and the Bretton Woods institutions [UN, 1996a] . In 1997, on the eve of the financial crisis, the GA once again called for strength ening international cooperation to prevent future currency crises, including by coordinating and ensuring the stability of macroeconomic policies, increasing transparency of financial sys tems, and strengthening the IMF's surveillance mechanisms [UN, 1997b] . After the 1998 cri sis, little had changed; key theses on the need for sound macroeconomic policies and a dialogue between developed and developing countries on reforming and strengthening the international financial system were complemented by the objectives of formulating a global approach to re solve the financial crisis; improving the work of financial organizations to prevent, manage and overcome crises; strengthening joint efforts of the UN, WB, IMF, RDBs and WTO [UN, 1998b] . The United States continued to oppose the consideration in the UN of issues such as governance of the IMF, the World Bank or regional development banks, or the problems related to the international financial architecture, emphasizing that it is the prerogative of the institu tions themselves, the Financial Stability Forum and the Group of 20 [UN, 1999b, p. 6 ]. This approach is reflected in the UN resolution "Towards a Strengthened and Stable International Financial Architecture Responsive to the Priorities of Growth and Development, Especially in Developing Countries, and to the Promotion of Economic and Social Equity" [UN, 2000a] 21 21 From the speech of the U.S. representative at the meeting: "After lengthy and frank negotiations, we believe that this year's draft resolution shows clear acceptance of the division of labour between the United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions. The United Nations, as a political organization of the international community, represents the political views of its Members. The Bretton Woods institutions, as separate financial institutions with their own charters and mandates, enjoy organizational and decisionmaking independence in dealing with world financial matters. We believe it is essential that the full independence of the international fi nancial institutions be completely respected and upheld, especially in a number of areas mentioned in the draft resolution. These include, but are not limited to, such areas of concern as the suggestion of regulatory frame works for shortterm capital flows and trade in currencies, as well as the consideration of the consolidation of a broader global agenda regarding the international financial system. In addition, we believe that it is critical that regional cooperation should support, not supplant, the global efforts of the international financial institutions. The international community recognizes the need to strengthen the international financial system. Experience has shown that international financial institutions are the most effective actors to help achieve that goal. Their independence, as well as their technical expertise and focus, are crucial to their credibility, and therefore to the success of their work. We fully expect that the international community will do everything it can to protect this credibility" [UN, 2000b, p. 6]. and, in fact, determined both the rigidity of the system for many years and its failure to prevent the 2008 crisis.
In the1990s, new aspects emerged in the area of trade and development related to help ing developing countries to implement the provisions of the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, including technical assistance for the wider use of the dispute settlement mechanism [UN, 1998c] . In the area of environmental preservation, measures to facilitate and finance access to environmentally sound technologies and the corresponding knowhow, and their transfer to developing countries on concessional and preferential terms, were discussed [UN, 1995b] . Regular reviews of the implementation of the International Development Strategy for the Fourth United Nations Development Decade and the commitments and policies agreed upon in the Declaration on International Economic Cooperation have become important compo nents of cooperation. Relevant reports served as a basis for assessing progress and formulating proposals for a future agenda.
22
The development of a new agenda and a global partnership for sustainable development was launched by a resolution adopted in March 1993 which set as an objective the preparation of a report on an agenda for development, including a comprehensive list of themes and areas, indicating their priority for the consideration of member states [UN, 1992c] . The long and extensive preparatory process culminated in the adoption of the Agenda for Development on 20 June 1997 [UN, 1997c] . The document defined development as "a multidimensional un dertaking to achieve a higher quality of life for all people," in which "economic development, social development and environmental protection are interdependent and mutually reinforcing components of sustainable development" [para. 1]. The Agenda for Development reflected the changed conditions of international cooperation, including the end of the Cold War, the glo balization of the world economy and finance, increasing interdependence and mutual vulner ability, and the impact of these processes on developing countries and development. Accord ingly, key objectives for strengthening international development cooperation and promoting development through an integrated approach were formulated.
The document incorporated all aspects and areas of cooperation. In economic policy, it provided for coordination of macroeconomic policies, liberalization of international trade, mobilization of domestic and external financial resources including the "peace dividend," do mestic capacitybuilding in science and technology, expansion of the potential for SouthSouth cooperation and regional economic cooperation, and balanced development in agriculture, in dustry and the services sectors. Social development priorities included eradication of hunger and poverty, expansion of productive employment, social integration, human resources devel opment and provision of adequate housing. The Agenda included issues such as the empow erment of women, the rights of the child, international migration, humanitarian issues, and measures relating to countries in special situations (Africa, leastdeveloped countries, small island states, landlocked countries). In the field of the environment, the document set as an objective the full implementation of the Agenda for the 21 century. Special attention was paid to the role of the UN and its bodies, the role of specialized agencies and the UN's interaction with other multilateral institutions, including the Bretton Woods institutions and the WTO.
The Agenda for Development has become an important milestone in shaping the future global partnership and a basis for elaborating the United Nations Millennium Declaration. The goals of the Declaration -eradicating poverty and hunger, achieving universal primary educa tion, reducing child mortality, improving maternal health, empowering women, fighting HIV/ AIDS, malaria and other diseases, protecting the environment, and building a global partner ship for development -identified modalities and areas of development cooperation in the first 15 years of the 21st century [UN, 2000d] .
Conclusion
The international community has come a long way toward building development cooperation in the secondhalf of the 20th century. The UN has become a cradle and a driver of this process and is the main factor for its success. The share of resolutions on development cooperation in the total number of resolutions comprised 10% (1010 out of 9713). The greatest number was adopted in the first two development decades, the period of elaborating instruments, developing first policy documents, identifying development priorities and harmonizing approaches to financing. The formation of the regulatory and organizational framework was reflected in the progressive growth in the share of programme resolutions and the consistently high proportion of resolutions on organizational and administrative issues. The share of resolutions on creating development as sistance instruments, which was quite high in the early years, decreased with the completion of institutional development. The role of trade in development determines the permanent presence of trade facilitation issues and problems of ensuring access to international markets for develop ing countries on the GA's agenda. The special needs of the leastdeveloped countries and other country categories that were most urgent in the early years retain their importance, but their share has significantly diminished. The problem of financing development was a crosscutting issue in all decades. However, in the first decades priorities included accelerating the flow of international aid and longterm capital, whereas starting from the mid1960s debt relief issues, problems of international liquidity and international financial system reform emerged.
There were achievements and challenges at each stage. Indisputable achievements result ing from collective efforts over 55 years include a consistent consolidation of its foundational programme documents from the first development decade to the sustainable development agenda, improvement of the review and evaluation instruments, integration of development and environmental issues, establishment of key institutions, including the Children's Fund, the Special Fund, UNDP, UNCTAD, the United Nations Industrial Cooperation Organization and the World Food Program, and increased financing for development. However, efforts to create external conditions for development based on a restructuring the international economic system with regard to developing countries' interests have failed. The 21st century inherited the systemic problems of the international monetary and trading systems. Obviously, if national egoism, political and ideological differences could have been overcome, the achievements of cooperation for development would have been much more significant. 
